Today the US Treasury Department added a Taliban financier and a Haqqani Network "communications official" to the list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists.

Abdul Baqi Bari, the Taliban leader, has funneled money to both al Qaeda and the Taliban, and has accepted funds from Osama bin Laden. Bakht Gul, the Haqqani Network operative, serves as a top aide to Badruddin Haqqani, and has helped "foreign fighters" enter Afghanistan.

Abdul Baqi Bari

Treasury said that Bari "has served as a Taliban money launderer and financial manager since at least 2001." He has used his businesses inside Afghanistan and in Pakistan to fund al Qaeda and Taliban operations, and has worked directly with both Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden. Bari has used banks, money exchanges, and hawalas to mask the movement of large sums of cash.

Bari is known to have received, handled, and distributed millions of dollars in cash. "In the twilight of the Taliban government," Bari was one of several individuals to have received a portion of more than $168 million from Afghanistan's national bank. "Bari was at the top of the list, according to the chief of Interpol in Afghanistan," Treasury stated. Also in 2002, Bari disbursed "$2.6 million in Taliban money" to an unnamed associate "to deposit in separate bank accounts."

Bari has interacted with al Qaeda in at least two instances. In 2001, Mullah Omar instructed Bari "to pay al Qaeda and Taliban supporters."

In 2002, Osama bin Laden "provided Bari and an associate $500,000 to purchase a
factory" for an unnamed company, "and Taliban personnel subsequently established satellite offices throughout Afghanistan," apparently using the company as cover for activities.

Additionally, "Bari used money exchange businesses in Pakistan to funnel financial support to the Taliban and al Qaeda and, in one instance, conducted a $400,000 hawala transfer for Mullah Omar," Treasury stated.

In addition to serving as a top financial official for the Taliban and al Qaeda, Bari facilitated the purchase of weapons for the Taliban.

In 2006, the Pakistani government is reported to have frozen 31 bank accounts belonging to Bari and his sons, as well as 15 accounts belonging to two companies owned by Bari, his family members, and Mullah Omar.

Bakht Gul

Treasury described Gul as "a key Haqqani Network communications official since at least 2009" who "works directly for senior Haqqani Network leader Badruddin Haqqani" and serves as his "gatekeeper." Treasury's description of Gull indicates he serves as Badruddin's chief of staff.

"Gul's responsibilities include relaying reports from commanders in Afghanistan to senior Haqqani Network officials, Taliban media officials, and legitimate media outlets in Afghanistan," the designation said. He also "relayed operational orders from Badruddin Haqqani to fighters in Afghanistan." Additionally he aids in "the movement of Haqqani insurgents, foreign fighters, and weapons," and has handed out funds to commanders traveling to Afghanistan.

Badruddin Haqqani is one of the Haqqani Network's top commanders, and was designated by the US as a terrorist in May 2011 for supporting operations in Afghanistan and aiding al Qaeda.

Top Haqqani Network leaders designated as terrorists

Gul is the latest Haqqani Network leader to have been added to the US's list of designated terrorists. Since 2008, nine top Haqqani Network leaders have been placed on the list; six of them were designated in 2011. All of them have ties to al Qaeda.

Despite the terror group's close ties to al Qaeda and its actions in Afghanistan, the US has not added the Haqqani Network to the list of Specially Designation Global Terrorist Entities. Members of Congress have urged the Obama administration to add the Haqqani Network as a terrorist entity.

Sirajuddin Haqqani, the overall leader of the Haqqani Network as well as the leader of the Taliban's Miramshah Regional Military Shura, was designated by the State Department as a terrorist in March 2008; and in March 2009, the State Department put out a bounty of $5 million for information leading to his capture. US intelligence officials have told The Long War Journal that Siraj is a member of al Qaeda's top council. In April 2010, Siraj said that cooperation between al Qaeda fighters and the Taliban "is at the highest limits."

Nasiruddin Haqqani, one of Siraj's brothers, was placed on the US's terrorist list in July 2010. Nasiruddin is a key financier and "emissary" for the Haqqani Network, and is known to have traveled to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates between 2004-2009 to carry out fundraising for the Haqqani Network, al Qaeda, and the Taliban.

Khalil al Rahman Haqqani, Siraj's uncle, was added to the US's list of terrorists in February 2011. Khalil is a key fundraiser, financier, and operational commander for the Haqqani Network, and has been crucial in aiding and supporting al Qaeda's military, the Lashkar al Zil or Shadow Army.

Badruddin Haqqani, another one of Siraj's brothers, was designated by the State Department on May 11, 2011. Badruddin sits on the Miramshah Shura, is an operational commander of the Haqqani Network, and provides support to al Qaeda and allied terror groups.

Ahmed Jan Wazir and Fazl Rabi were added to the list of designated terrorists in June 2011. Wazir serves as a deputy, advisor, and spokesman for Siraj, has represented the Haqqani Network at the Quetta Shura, and has close ties to al Qaeda's network in Ghazni. Rabi is a key financial official for both the Taliban and the Haqqani Network who has also aided the terror group in executing suicide attacks in Afghanistan and has traveled to the Gulf countries to raise money for Jalaluddin and Siraj.

Mullah Sangeen Zadran, a senior lieutenant to Siraj and the Taliban's shadow governor for Paktika province in Afghanistan, was added to the list of designated terrorists on Aug. 16, 2011. US military officials have told The Long War Journal that Sangeen is considered to be one of the most dangerous operational commanders in eastern Afghanistan and has organized multiple assaults on US and Afghan combat outposts in the region. Sangeen is currently holding Bowe Bergdahl, the only US soldier who has been captured alive in the Afghan theater.

Haji Mali Khan, who has been described by the US military as "one of the highest ranking members of the Haqqani Network and a revered elder of the Haqqani clan," was added on Nov. 1, 2011. Khan was captured by US special operations forces during a raid on Sept. 27 in the Musa Khel district in Afghanistan's eastern province of Khost.

Jalaluddin Haqqani, who is the father of Siraj, Nasiruddin, and Badruddin and also the brother of Khalil, has not been added to the US's list of terrorists, despite his close links to both the Taliban and al Qaeda. In an interview with Al Somood, the Taliban's official magazine, Jalaluddin admitted he served on the Taliban's executive council, which is known as the Quetta Shura.

Background on the Haqqani Network

The Haqqani Network operates primarily in the Afghan provinces of Khost, Paktia, and Paktika, but also has an extensive presence in Kabul, Logar, Wardak, Ghazni, Zabul, Kandahar, and Kunduz. In addition, the network has expanded its operations into the distant Afghan provinces of Badakhshan and Faryab.

The terror group has close links with al Qaeda and the Taliban, and its relationship with Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) has allowed the network to survive and thrive in its fortress stronghold of North Waziristan, a tribal agency in Pakistan. The Haqqani Network has also extended its presence into the Pakistani tribal agency of Kurram.

In North Waziristan, the Haqqanis control large swaths of the tribal area and run a parallel administration with courts, recruiting centers, tax offices, and security forces. In addition, the Haqqanis have established multiple training camps and safe houses used by al Qaeda leaders and operatives, as well as by Taliban foot soldiers preparing to fight in Afghanistan.

The Haqqani Network has been implicated in some of the biggest terror attacks in the Afghan capital city of Kabul, including the January 2008 suicide assault on the Serena hotel, the February 2009 assault on Afghan ministries, and the July 2008 and October 2009 suicide attacks against the Indian embassy.

The terror group collaborated with elements of Pakistan's military and intelligence service in at least one of these attacks. In the past, American intelligence agencies confronted the Pakistani government with evidence, including communications intercepts, which proved the ISI's direct involvement in the 2008 Indian embassy bombing. [See LWJ report Pakistan's Jihad and Threat Matrix report Pakistan backs Afghan Taliban for additional information on the ISI's complicity in attacks in Afghanistan and the region.]

Last summer and fall, the US and the Afghan government linked the Haqqani Network and Pakistan's intelligence service to the June 2010 assault on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul in June 2011 and the attack on the US Embassy and ISAF headquarters in September. Shortly after the attack, Admiral Michael Mullen, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, accused the Haqqani Network of being one of several "[e]xtremist organizations serving as proxies of the government of Pakistan."

The US military has been hunting top Haqqani Network commanders in special operations raids in the Afghan east, while the CIA has targeted the network with a series of unmanned Predator airstrikes in Pakistan's tribal agency of North Waziristan. Both Siraj and Sangeen have been the targets of past strikes. Mohammed Haqqani, a mid-level Haqqani Network military commander and a brother of Siraj, was killed in a Predator airstrike in February 2010.

In October 2011, the Predators were successful in killing Jan Baz Zadran, who was considered to be the Haqqani Network's third in command, during an Oct. 13 airstrike in the Miramshah area of North Waziristan. Jan Baz was a powerful leader in the Haqqani Network. He was believed to be the top aide to the network's operational commander, Sirajuddin Haqqani. Jan Baz served as the Haqqani Network's logistical and financial coordinator, and also acquired weapons and ammunition for the network. He is thought to be the most senior Haqqani Network leader killed or captured since the US invaded Afghanistan in 2001.

While the US is targeting the Haqqani Network in military operations and with financial sanctions, it also seeks to negotiate with the terror group to help end the insurgency in Afghanistan. The US is pursuing a policy of "fight, talk, build" with the Haqqanis and other Taliban groups. US officials are said to have met with Ibrahim Haqqani in August 2011 as he was visiting the United Arab Emirates, in an attempt to gauge the Haqqani Network's willingness to negotiate. The talks have failed. Siraj Haqqani has publicly said the group will not independently negotiate with the US and would only do so under the banner of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

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The US killed two al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula fighters in an airstrike in eastern Yemen today. The strike is the sixth by the US in the past week, and takes place as the Yemeni government is intensifying military operations against AQAP strongholds in the south.

Today's strike took place in the town of Shibam in eastern Hadramout province. Unmanned US drones, the Reapers or Predators, fired missiles at a vehicle as it was traveling in the eastern city, according to AFP. Two AQAP operatives were killed in the airstrike. The identities of those killed have not been disclosed.

Shibam is known to have an AQAP presence. On April 1, AQAP fighters overran an outpost in Shibam and brutally executed seven soldiers. The US has not conducted an airstrike in Hadramout province since the campaign began in late 2009.

The Yemeni military has launched an offensive against AQAP in Zinjibar, the provincial capital of Abyan, as well as in Jaar and Lawdar, two other cities in the southern province. More than 20,000 Yemeni troops, backed by US CIA and military advisers and air and naval forces, are involved in the offensive.

AQAP is in control of Zinjibar and Jaar, and had a strong presence outside of Lawdar, where fighting has been heavy. Yemeni troops are also said to have entered Zinjibar. More than 150 Yemenis are reported to have been killed over the past several days.

US strikes in Yemen

The US has now carried at least seven drone strikes in Yemen this month; all seven have taken place over the past week. Other recent airstrikes are believed to have been carried out by the US also, but little evidence has emerged to directly link the attacks to the US.

The US conducted six airstrikes against AQAP in Yemen in March, and at least six more in April.

The CIA and the US military's Joint Special Operations Command are known to have conducted at least 36 air and missile strikes inside Yemen since December 2009, including today's strike in Hadramout province. [For more information on the US airstrikes in Yemen, see LWJ report, Charting the data for US air strikes in Yemen, 2002 - 2012.]

Since the beginning of May 2011, the US is known to have carried out 30 airstrikes in Yemen, with 20 of those strikes taking place so far in 2012. This year, the US appears to be targeting both AQAP leaders and foot soldiers in an effort to support Yemeni military operations against the terror group. AQAP has taken control of vast areas in southern Yemen and has been expanding operations against the government, with raids on military bases in locations previously thought to be outside the terror group's control.

Three senior AQAP operatives have been killed in 20 strikes so far this year. The most recent strike that killed a senior AQAP leader took place on May 6, when the US killed Fahd al Quso in a drone attack in Shabwa province. Quso, who has been described as AQAP's external operations chief, was involved in numerous terrorist attacks, including the 2000 suicide attack on the USS Cole that killed 17 US sailors. The US obtained the information leading to Quso from a Saudi operative who had penetrated AQAP.

On Jan. 31, US drones killed Abdul Mun'im Salim al Fatahani near the city of Lawdar in Abyan province. Fatahani was also involved in the suicide attack on the USS Cole, as well as the bombing that damaged the Limburg oil tanker in 2002. AQAP said that Fatahani had fought in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The US also killed Mohammed Saeed al Umda (a.k.a. Ghareeb al Taizi) in an April 22 drone strike on a convoy in the Al Samadah area of Marib province. Prior to the downfall of the Taliban regime in 2001, he had attended the Al Farouq military training camp in Afghanistan. Umda served as a member of Osama bin Laden's bodyguard in Afghanistan before returning to Yemen, and was involved in the October 2002 suicide attack on the French oil tanker Limburg. He escaped from a Yemeni jail in 2006.

The pace of the US airstrikes has increased as AQAP and its political front, Ansar al Sharia, have taken control of vast areas of southern Yemen. AQAP controls the cities of Zinjibar, Al Koud, Jaar, and Shaqra in Abyan province. The terror group also holds Azzan in Shabwa province. AQAP seized control of Rada'a in Baydah province in January but later withdrew after negotiating a peace agreement with the local government.

US intelligence officials believe that al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula poses a direct threat to the homeland. The latest AQAP plot against the West, involving an underwear bomb that is nearly undetectable and was to be detonated on an airliner, was foiled earlier this month. The terror group has planned multiple attacks against targets in the US. A strike in Yemen last year killed Anwar al Awlaki, the radical, US-born cleric who plotted attacks against the US, and Samir Khan, another American who served as a senior AQAP propagandist.

Hakeemullah Mehsud [right] as he organized the attack on a prison in Bannu.

The Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan released a propaganda video that details the April 15 jailbreak in Bannu that freed 384 prisoners, including an estimated 200 Taliban members and an al Qaeda-linked terrorist who attempted to assassinate former President Pervez Musharraf. Two of the top leaders of he Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, who are often reported to be at odds with each other, are shown organizing the attack and mustering more than 150 fighters.

The 34-minute-long video, which was produced by Umar Studio, the propaganda arm of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, was originally being sold in bazaars in North and South Waziristan, according to the International News Network. The videotape was then published in three parts on YouTube by the Khyber News Channel [see parts 1, 2 and 3].

Hakeemullah Mehsud, the emir of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, and Waliur Rehman Mehsud, the group's leader in South Waziristan, both appear in the video. Both men give speeches, and Hakeemullah vows to fight the Pakistani government and military to "the last bullet and the last man." Hakeemullah and Waliur Rehman are routinely said to be in violent opposition to each other, and were even wrongly reported to have killed each other during a shura meeting in August 2009 to select Baitullah Mehsud's successor.

In the video, both Hakeemullah and Waliur Rehman are shown directing an estimated 150 fighters who are gathering to conduct the attack. The Taliban leaders are organizing the large Taliban group in the daylight out in the open. The location of the meeting place is not clear.

The Taliban appear to have had good intelligence on the layout of the Bannu prison. A Taliban leader, whose face is digitally blurred, uses a detailed hand-drawn map to brief the Taliban commanders and fighters on the plan of attack.

The fighters are then shown eating and praying before being put into vans and driven to the Bannu prison. The tape shows the nighttime assault as the Taliban attack the prison with rocket-propelled grenades, heavy machine-guns, and assault rifles. The Taliban are then shown opening the jail cells and releasing the prisoners.

The video also includes interviews of the freed commanders and prisoners. Adnan Rasheed, a Pakistani terrorist who was involved in the Dec. 14, 2003 assassination attempt against then-President Pervez Musharraf, is among those interviewed. Rasheed was a member of the Pakistani Air Force and has been sentenced to death for his role.

Rasheed worked for Amjad Farooqi, the Pakistani terrorist who engineered the two assassination attempts against Musharraf in December 2003 at the behest of al Qaeda leader Abu Faraj al Libi; Farooqi is suspected of involvement in other terror attacks as well. Farooqi was a member of the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan; the Harkat-ul-Ansar and its successor, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen; Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami; and Jaish-e-Mohammed. He served as a close aide to Qari Saifullah Akhtar, the leader of the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami. In addition, Farooqi served as the group's representative to al Qaeda's International Islamic Front.